


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19 November 1965

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

State Dept. review completed

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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(Information as of noon EST, 18 November 1965)

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25X1 Military action this week involved heavy fighting in western Pleiku Province that has resulted thus far in Communist losses of 1,186 killed. Elsewhere, Viet Cong activity continued far above average. Premier Ky returned from his South Korean visit, to face a growing dissatisfaction in the Catholic community of Saigon. Hanoi's [redacted] statements again denounced the US buildup and emphasized domestic American demonstrations against the war, while Peking's propaganda played up alleged VC victories. Four new SAM sites were confirmed.	

The Communist World

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Peking's most recent attack on the Soviet leadership provides new evidence that the Vietnam war is one of the most divisive elements in the deepening split. The editorial not only promises unrelenting assault on the USSR, but also seems intended as a sharp admonition to Hanoi against reliance on Moscow.

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SOVIET-WESTERN TRADE DECLINES

The USSR continues to conserve its hard-currency resources and has taken no new initiatives to place orders for Western equipment, but the recent approval of the 1966 economic plan may soon give an indication of the future direction of Soviet trade.

CZECHOSLOVAK CABINET AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES

Organizational and personnel changes in both the cabinet and the economic ministries demonstrate President Novotny's determination to go ahead with his regime's plans for economic reform.

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- YEMENI TRIBES SEEK END TO THREE YEARS' CIVIL WAR**
Republican and royalist leaders are scheduled to meet at Harad on 23 November to form a caretaker government that is to oversee evacuation of Egyptian troops over the coming months. The conference provides the first major test of local support for the Nasir-Faysal agreement, but its outcome depends primarily upon the interplay of traditional political pressures that have made and broken three other Yemeni revolts since World War II. At the moment, most Yemeni leaders seem to want to end the years of bloodshed and to secure the evacuation of the Egyptians. (Published separately)
- TSHOMBÉ WINS A ROUND IN THE CONGO** 17
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- NENNI SCORES VICTORY AT ITALIAN SOCIALIST CONGRESS 22
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VIETNAM

Military action this week involved heavy fighting in western Pleiku Province between US troops and at least four North Vietnamese regiments.

Elements of the US First Cavalry Division in the Plei Me area made initial contact with the enemy force during the afternoon of 14 November. In addition to the usual artillery and tactical air support, B-52 Stratofortresses also bombed Communist concentrations in close proximity to the battle line. The fighting, reported continuing on 17 November, has resulted thus far in confirmed Communist losses of 1,186 killed and 18 captured. US casualties total 158 killed and 191 wounded; four US aircraft have also been lost.

[redacted]
confirmation by US military authorities in Saigon of two additional North Vietnamese (PAVN) regiments in Pleiku Province, raising the number in South Vietnam to seven.

[redacted] additional regiments in Quang Tri, Kontum, and Pleiku provinces [redacted]

In the III Corps area, both Vietnamese and US troops scored victories on 11 November. During a seven-hour battle north of Ben Cat in Binh Duong Province, troops

of the US First Infantry Division killed 198 Viet Cong while sustaining losses of 20 killed and 83 wounded. Vietnamese forces also successfully countered an attempted VC ambush in Phuoc Tuy Province, killing 131 Communists while sustaining 26 casualties.

Elsewhere, Viet Cong activity continued far above average. Communist forces launched a damaging attack in Kien Giang Province, overran a district headquarters in Quang Tin Province, and sabotaged the coastal railroad at several points.


Political Developments in Saigon

Premier Ky returned early this week from an official visit^{25X1} to South Korea. The communiqué on the visit indicated that the two governments would explore means of increasing economic and technical cooperation, but made no reference to any further Korean troop commitments. Before^{25X1} leaving Seoul, Premier Ky also reiterated his continued opposition to any peace negotiations with the Communists. ^{25X1}

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The Indochina - South China Area

— South Vietnamese military boundaries

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Hanoi's Outlook on the War

In both public and private statements this week, Hanoi emphasized the American demonstrations against the war as an important factor in bringing about an end to US involvement in Vietnam. Hanoi issued its second official statement in two weeks denouncing the American military buildup in South Vietnam. This statement, like its predecessor on 5 November, expressed firm confidence in the Viet Cong and also put considerable emphasis on the importance of the US domestic opposition to the war. A party daily editorial dwelt at much greater length on the increasing economic, political, and social strains that allegedly will be imposed on the US as a result of involvement in Vietnam. Clearly, Hanoi now is pinning considerable hope on this as a factor to force concessions in US policy. It is possible that this DRV emphasis results in part from the unfavorable outcome of recent fighting in South Vietnam.

In its propaganda Hanoi continued to reiterate absolute faith in the ability of the Viet Cong to win despite the increasing strength of American and allied forces. Several DRV commentaries last week explicitly attempted to debunk the US "lie" that the VC have lost the initiative in South Vietnam, and on the 15th Hanoi hosted a special delegation of Liberation Front "military heroes" as a public demonstration of its support. Although overt delegations from the Front to North Vietnam are extremely rare, this group is receiving red-carpet treatment and extensive publicity coverage. 25X1

The French Government apparently believes the time is ripe for a new exploration of North Vietnamese views. 25X1

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Chinese Play Up VC Victories

Chinese propaganda also played up alleged VC "victories" in an apparent effort to bolster Vietnamese determination to continue in the face of heavier American military blows. The People's Daily on 15 November claimed the "complete annihilation" of two US infantry battalions and an artillery battery on 12 November at "Bao Bang." The Chinese are referring to the VC attack on the US First Infantry Division near Ben Cat and cite this battle as "further proof" that the US forces are "no match for the Vietnamese people, who are waging a just people's war." US casualty figures on the Ben Cat engagement indicate VC personnel losses outnumbered US by a ratio of nine to one.

While Peking apparently intends these comments to encourage the Vietnamese, public Chinese statements warning of direct intervention in Vietnam are becoming more subdued. The congratulatory message sent by the China-Vietnam Friendship Association to the Liberation Front on 15 November, hailing the "great victory" at Bao Bang, contained only the general statement that the Chinese would continue to "stand unwaveringly by the side of the fraternal Viet-

namese people and carry the struggle against US imperialism through to the end, no matter to what extent" the US escalates the war.

DRV Air Defense

Four additional SAM sites in the DRV were confirmed [redacted] this week, bringing the total number to 45. Two of the new sites are northwest of Hanoi, one is south of the capital, and the fourth near Ninh Binh.

SAM defenses caused the loss of two US aircraft last week, five others were lost to ground fire, and one for mechanical reasons. Of the 160 aircraft lost to date, eight have been downed by SAMs.

North Vietnamese fighters have become considerably more active in areas of US air strikes, several attempts having been made to attack US support aircraft.

It is believed that the Vietnamese are still placing primary reliance on their SAM and antiaircraft artillery defenses, and will commit their fighters only when they believe the odds are heavily in their favor. North Vietnam's current fighter inventory numbers 64 MIG-15/17 aircraft. [redacted]

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The Communist World

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Peking's most recent attack on the leadership of the Soviet party provides new evidence that the Vietnam war has become one of the most divisive elements in the deepening Sino-Soviet split. Peking's latest polemical blast--an editorial in People's Daily - Red Flag of 11 November--promises an unrelenting assault on the Soviet Union and at the same time seems intended as a sharp admonition to Hanoi against reliance on the Soviet Union. It also contains a strong warning against alleged Soviet efforts to promote a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, and may be intended in part as an answer to Communist critics abroad who deplore Peking's unwillingness to compromise with Moscow.

The latest outburst probably reflects an over-all frustration with China's recent setbacks around the world, but Peking's anger seems to have been especially aroused by indications that the North Vietnamese are continuing to take a middle position in the Sino-Soviet dispute and have been pushing for coordinated Sino-Soviet action in the war.

The day before the editorial appeared, People's Daily devoted nearly three pages to reprinting anti-Chinese statements attributed to Soviet leaders and to Communists in Eastern Europe, France, and Italy. An editorial note explained that this material had been published to expose the "revisionists and splitters" in their true colors. It had been scheduled for publication on 2 Novem-

ber, but was summarily held up more than a week for reasons that remain unclear. Publication of the People's Daily - Red Flag editorial--clearly a set-piece constructed with great care some time ago--may also have been delayed. This may reflect a high-level difference of opinion concerning the timing of a new major attack against the Soviets centered on the Vietnam question. The delay in publication would also permit the Chinese to exploit Soviet statements made on the occasion of the "October Revolution" festivities in Moscow on 6 and 7 November. The reprints, when they did appear, contained Soviet First Deputy Premier Polyansky's remark at the Kremlin October rally that Moscow had done everything possible to improve relations with Peking and that the next move was up to the Chinese leaders.

Hanoi's propaganda during the October festivities warmly praised the Soviet leaders and thanked Moscow for its assistance. The party paper Nhan Dan prominently featured pictures of Brezhnev and Kosygin and praised both by name.

By contrast the People's Daily - Red Flag attacked both Kosygin and Brezhnev by name, and asserted that the Soviet leaders have ulterior motives in giving aid to the Vietnamese. The Chinese claimed that what the Russians have provided is in no way commensurate with Soviet capabilities. The Chinese maintained that the Soviets

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were providing assistance only to keep the situation in Vietnam "under their control" with the object of striking a "bargain with the US on it," and stressed the impossibility of taking "united action" with those who behave in this way.

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The article charged that as long ago as last February the Soviets proposed to Peking and Hanoi that a new international conference on Vietnam be called "without prior conditions." In

[redacted]
[redacted] the Chinese asserted this was tantamount to advocating "unconditional negotiations." They then reiterated the importance they attach to a withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam, charging that Moscow collaborated with Indian and Yugoslav efforts to act as "brokers" in

the Vietnam question, and noting explicitly that the nonaligned powers avoided any mention of the "crucial question" of a US withdrawal.

Initial Soviet commentary dismissed the latest Chinese broadside as "groundless and provocative fabrications." A dispatch from a Pravda correspondent in Peking stressed China's open rejection of repeated appeals by Moscow and other foreign parties for united action on Vietnam and the consequent danger to the "common cause." The Soviets undoubtedly plan to exploit this to place the onus on Peking for interparty difficulties, but will probably continue to avoid being provoked into a full-scale polemical exchange. Moscow's reaction reflects its satisfaction with the relative success of its current tactics in the Sino-Soviet conflict. [redacted]

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SOVIET-WESTERN TRADE DECLINES

The USSR continues to conserve its hard currency resources and has taken no new initiatives to place orders for Western equipment, deliveries of which on old orders are dwindling.

Moscow has had to sell during the last three months about \$300 million worth of gold from its decreasing stockpile to pay for shipments of wheat through early 1966. The gravity of its concern over the foreign exchange situation, exacerbated by the wheat imports, is apparent in its attention to measures to save-- or maximize earnings of--hard currency. Sales of platinum have been manipulated to provide the maximum foreign exchange, according to a Soviet official. The USSR also has engaged in silver sales for the first time in many years, but these efforts earn only small amounts of foreign exchange. These modest measures follow an export promotion program that has not been a major success. In-

creased sales of oil and wood products last year netted only moderate gains in hard currency.

Failure this year to place substantial orders for the technologically advanced equipment that the USSR requires also is due in part to Soviet planning difficulties. The relative weight of hard currency stringency and planning problems soon may become clearer. The draft economic plan for 1966 has now been completed and directions to Soviet trade negotiators for next year's business should be apparent in their dealings with Western counterparts.

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SECRET**CZECHOSLOVAK CABINET AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES**

Czech President and party First Secretary Novotny has demonstrated his determination to go ahead with the regime's plans for economic reform by making organizational and personnel changes in the cabinet and the economic ministries. He has also used the opportunity to rid himself of at least one political thorn in his side, liberal-minded Education and Culture Minister Cestmir Cisar.

The cabinet shuffle is designed to bring in qualified and --in most cases--younger men who are technically equipped to lead the government's ministries and its newly formed commissions in implementing the economic reforms. For example, Slovak National Council President Michal Chudik was replaced as minister without portfolio by a more technically oriented man, Jan Marko, Slovakia's former commissioner

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CZECHOSLOVAK CABINET AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES
November 1965

OLD			NEW		
Position	Name	Since	Position	Name	Former Position
Deputy Premier	Jan Pillar	1962	Deputy Premier	Josef Krejci	Minister of Metallurgy and Ore Mines
Minister of Metallurgy and Ore Mines	Josef Krejci	1962	Minister of Mining	Frantisek Penc	Chief, Central Committee Department for Fuel and Power
Minister of Fuel	Josef Odvarka	1963	Minister of Heavy Industry	Josef Krejci	Minister of Metallurgy and Ore Mines
Minister of Heavy Engineering	Josef Pesl	1962	Minister of Chemical Industry	Vaclav Vales	First Deputy Minister of Chemical Industry
Minister of Chemical Industry	Jozef Pucik	1954	Minister of Education and Culture	Jiri Hajek	Permanent UN Representative
Minister of Education and Culture	Cestmir Cisar	1963	Permanent UN Representative	Milan Klusak (probably)	Permanent UN Representative in Geneva (in NY past 3 mos.)
Permanent Representative to United Nations	Jiri Hajek	1962	Minister without Portfolio	Jan Marko	Slovak Commissioner for Capital Construction
Minister without Portfolio	Michal Chudik	1963	Minister-Chairman, State Commission for Technology	Frantisek Vlasak	Minister-Chairman, State Commission for Development and Coordination of Science and Technology
Minister-Chairman, State Commission for Development and Coordination of Science and Technology	Frantisek Vlasak	1963	Deputy Premier-Chairman, State Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation	Otakar Simunek	Deputy Premier and Representative to Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)
		split to	Minister-Chairman, Central Administration of Water Conservancy	Jozef Smrkovsky	Deputy Chairman, Central Office for Peoples Control and Statistics
		split from Agriculture Ministry	Minister-Chairman, State Commission for Finance, Wages, and Prices	Bohumil Sucharda	Deputy Chairman, Central Office for Peoples Control and Statistics
		newly created	Chairman, State Commission for Management and Organization	Josef Toman	Deputy Chief, Central Committee Economics Department

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for capital construction. The new appointees also include Bohumil Sucharda, chairman of the new State Commission for Finance, Prices, and Wages. As Western observers have been quick to point out, Sucharda served as economic manager of the International Monetary Fund in Washington from 1948 to 1950.

Such revitalization has been occurring over the past year throughout Czechoslovakia and has affected, much to their consternation, middle-level functionaries and plant managers--conservatives who form the core of Novotny's support and who have long held their jobs for purely political reasons. Novotny's economically realistic treatment of his conservative backers reflects both his conviction that the reforms are essential and his newly found self-confidence. It also seems likely that he has Moscow's backing for reform, though probably not for the specific method.

Proving that he is still not the "liberals'" man, however, Novotny used the cabinet shuffle to rid himself of his [redacted] highly influential, and liberal

cultural minister. Cisar, who lost his job as party secretary only nine months after receiving it--mainly because he was too liberal for Novotny, reportedly will be posted as ambassador to London or Paris. His removal will be a blow to party intellectuals who have depended upon his liberal rule of the ministry to get their critical ideas and comments through government censors and restrictions.

Cisar will be replaced by the permanent Czech representative to the UN, Jiri Hajek, who cannot be expected to continue his predecessor's vigorous liberalism. Hajek's reassignment has long been rumored, but Hajek himself probably had his eye on a more suitable post in foreign affairs for which he is better qualified. Apparently replacing Hajek at the UN is Milan Klusak, [redacted] who, in addition to serving in numerous foreign policy posts, was from 1948 to 1951 private secretary to Jan Masaryk, Vladimir Clementis, and Viliam Siroky, in that order. He will probably bring little independence to his new job. [redacted]

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Asia-Africa

INDONESIAN ARMY MAINTAINS DRIVE AGAINST COMMUNISTS

The Indonesian Army's drive against the Communist Party (PKI) is maintaining its momentum, and President Sukarno is beginning to bend to army pressure.

Last week Sukarno did make several moves to reassert his position, however. New regulations returned supervision of the press to Sukarno's information minister, and army administration of the Indonesian radio was ended. On 10 November, Sukarno lifted the "state of war" measures in the Djakarta area.

Sukarno's show of strength apparently alarmed the army and sparked several countermoves. The Djakarta military commander stated that his orders were to remain in effect despite the lifting of martial law, and the army information chief claims that radio reporting policy is still in army hands. On 13 November, army commander Major General Suharto announced a planned reorganization of the cabinet and the Supreme Operations Command to reduce their subservience to Sukarno. In a strong speech the same day, Defense Minister

Nasution advocated the banning of the PKI as a "traitor to the state."

Early this week Nasution ordered a purge of all army elements having foreknowledge of the coup attempt, and a presidential order was issued to dismiss civilian government employees implicated in the coup. This was the first public association of Sukarno with the army-backed purge, and has aroused speculation that Sukarno may soon give in to army pressure and ban the PKI. He may make his intentions clearer on Saturday when, according to an announcement by Suharto, Sukarno is to give the Indonesians an important message.

A formal ban by Sukarno would deal a major psychological blow to the PKI, and in the meantime its suppression by the army is proceeding. Even before Sukarno's order, the army had undertaken to remove party members from government departments. Members are being rounded up on Celebes and in Central Java. In addition, mass slayings of Communists have 25X1 been reported in East and Central Java, chiefly by Muslim and other anti-Communist groups.

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COMMUNISTS EXERTING PRESSURE IN CENTRAL LAOS

Since early November Communist forces have been exerting pressure against government positions in central Laos. In the Kham Keut area, government units have been pushed out of the important Nam Theun River valley that had been wrested from Communist control in September. The enemy has not moved against government fall-back positions.

Near Thakhek, reinforced government forces, with significant air support, apparently have blunted Communist probes, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. Government efforts to clear sections of Route 12 east of Thakhek, taken by the enemy last week, have had only limited success, however. The Communists are also maintaining positions astride Route 13 south of Thakhek.

A report that substantial numbers of Communist troops moved west on Route 12 between 14 and 16 November suggests that the enemy intends to maintain its current activity. It is unlikely, however, that the Communists, whose interests are centered in the corridor area of southeastern Laos, are planning major moves into the Mekong Valley.

The first significant south-bound movement of trucks in the panhandle this dry season has been observed on Route 23 by a roadwatch team on the northern section of the route. A total of 59 trucks, 42 of them carrying troops of unidentified origin, moved south between 11 and 12 November. Farther south, in-
[redacted] trucks were moving south on Route 92 in late October in numbers as large as 17 at a time. [redacted]

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NEW PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT OUTLINES PROGRAM


President-elect Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines has enunciated a program of domestic reform and closer ties with friendly Asian countries within the framework of a continued pro-Western foreign policy. His ability to institute even the modest changes he seems to have in mind will be limited by an unfriendly lower house of Congress when he takes office on 1 January.

On the basis of still incomplete returns from the elections of 9 November, Marcos defeated incumbent President Diosdado Macapagal by over 600,000 votes, unusually large for the Philippines. His Nacionalista running mate for the vice-presidency, Fernando Lopez, is clinging to a slender lead of only 50,000 votes. Marcos' Nacionalistas lost the House of Representatives to the Liberals, 37 to 59, with 8 seats going to

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independents. Apparently neither party will have a majority in the Senate.

In a press conference following the election, Marcos said he planned to commit the Philippines to an increasing role in regional affairs, and indicated he will emphasize SEATO's non-military aspects. He expressed a desire for a rapprochement with Malaysia, which the Macapagal government refused to recognize because of the Philippine claim to a part of Sabah (North Borneo). He indicated that he, like Macapagal, is willing to commit Philippine troops to Vietnam, with the hedge that this would be done only if they "were needed" and if

a political solution did not seem in the offing.

Marcos evidently intends to maintain close relations with the US, irrespective of the occasional irritants arising from the presence of US military installations, and from the substantial American business interest in the Philippine economy. At the same time, a slowly emerging nationalism is likely to cause Manila to seek closer identification with Afro-Asian nations and to make the relationship with the US more nearly one between equals. During the campaign Marcos referred obliquely to this desire when he called for a more "mature" relationship.

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COMMUNIST MILITARY AID TO INDIA

A new round of substantive negotiations for additional Soviet military aid to India may be under way.

An official responsible for defense production has been in Moscow with the Indian finance minister. They probably discussed a recently prepared shopping list for major military items under what appears to be an open-ended Soviet-Indian military pact that permits New Delhi to seek additional equipment from time to time. Items believed to be included in the shopping list are

SU-7 fighter-bomber aircraft, and antitank guided missiles, as well as additional MIG-21 jet fighters, helicopters, field guns, and antiaircraft artillery. The USSR is expected to be receptive to the Indian initiative, but probably will specify relatively stringent terms.

Moscow probably expects to increase its influence in New Delhi at a time when the West is withholding similar aid. By extending offers of economic aid to Rawalpindi, the USSR has sought to avoid a sharp Pakistani reaction.

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The importance of the USSR as an arms source to India has risen significantly during the past year, however, and will probably continue to grow.

The USSR has delivered or is committed to provide India with about \$500 million worth of military materiel. The program, originally designed to meet some of the needs of the Indian Air Force, now includes all branches of the armed forces and covers the production of jet fighter planes and other air defense materiel in India.

Moscow has been joined by Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, who now also furnish a variety of supplies and equipment. Prague is converting its armor to new models, and will supply India with surplus T-54 medium tanks, presumably at a price considerably more attractive than that quoted by the USSR for the T-55 medium tank. Bulgaria, with only a minor capability to supply military

equipment, is offering to accept rupee payment for small antiaircraft artillery, antitank guns, mortars, and ammunition. Communications equipment is to be provided by Hungary. Yugoslavia is supplying antiaircraft guns and ammunition.

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INDIA FACES MAJOR FOOD CRISIS

The Shastri government, recently strengthened by Indian successes during the India-Pakistan war, now faces a major food crisis that could bring near-famine to many parts of India during the next 12 months.

Seriously deficient monsoon rains have damaged the fall food-grain crop which may be as much as 6 million tons below last autumn's 59.8-million-ton harvest. Fall crops account for four fifths of India's annual food production, and even a bountiful spring harvest will not greatly improve the food situation in 1966. Foodgrain production during the agricultural year ending next June may prove to be as low as 82 million tons, while grain requirements for feeding India's rapidly growing population could reach 97 million tons.

Harbor facilities are already hard pressed to off-load India's present annual grain imports of over 7 million tons--6 million of which is supplied under the US PL-480 program. It is doubtful that cargo handling capacity can be expanded sufficiently to absorb the doubled grain imports that will probably be required if present consumption levels are to be maintained.

New Delhi is considering several emergency steps: the sowing of marginal land, ex-

panded planting of two crops annually, and greater austerity in food consumption, including food rationing in urban areas. These are unlikely to have much effect during the next year, however. Already, attempts to make rationing effective in Calcutta are being thwarted by inadequate administrative resources and evasiveness on the part of grain producers and middlemen.

The major snag in expanding agricultural production, the inadequate supply of chemical fertilizers, is no nearer to solution. Yields per acre from the depleted soil remain the lowest in the world. Domestic fertilizer production has fallen far short of planned targets, while government allocations from India's limited foreign exchange holdings have not allowed enough fertilizer imports to meet the current demand. Defense-related industries' competition for hard-currency imports may increase in the wake of the conflict with Pakistan.

A major food crisis next year would add further strains to the often touchy relations between the central and the state governments, whose responsibilities in agricultural matters overlap. It would also prove a handicap to Congress Party governments--both central and state--as they prepare to face general elections in early 1967.

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TSHOMBE WINS A ROUND IN THE CONGO

This week former premier Tshombé won a round in his contest with President Kasavubu for future leadership of the Congo. Parliament narrowly rejected the government presented by Premier Evariste Kimba, whom Kasavubu had named to replace Tshombé in the premiership one month ago. Kasavubu and his working ally, Interior Minister Nendaka, had counted on reducing Tshombé's political strength before the presidential elections, scheduled to be held this winter.

Nendaka, army chief General Mobutu, and others, are now losing some of their confidence that Kasavubu can hold the presidency. The political alliance behind him is far from cohesive. Nendaka, for example, reportedly gave only half-hearted support at best to the Kimba government in its parliamentary test. Other Kasavubu backers are becoming concerned over Nendaka's soaring political ambitions.

The next hurdle will come when the President presents a second Kimba government to Parliament. Another Tshombé-instigated rejection would cost Kasavubu further political strength and prestige. If the President does not feel he can muster sufficient votes, he may attempt to take advantage of the parliamentary recess due on 6 December to ride along with a caretaker regime. In any event, economic and administrative problems will receive little official attention before the new president's installation.

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POWER STRUGGLE IN BURUNDI

A bitter power struggle among Tutsi politicians in Burundi's capital continues on after last month's coup attempt, and could lead to large-scale violence at any time.

Tutsi extremists, led by former premier Andre Muhirwa, now are reportedly preparing to take over the government with the support of recently armed Tutsi refugees from adjacent Rwanda.

Chances are also increasing that the Tutsis may sponsor the re-

turn of Chinese Communist diplomats, who were expelled last January.

Outside the capital, disorders could erupt again as a result of some Tutsi officials' harassment of the majority Hutu tribesmen. Although undoubtedly motivated in part by personal vengeance, Tutsi activities may also be designed to eliminate completely the local Hutu intelligentsia, who might cause future trouble.

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CYPRUS TENSIONS EASE

Negotiations are continuing in an effort to prevent further violence in Famagusta, but the problems that led to fighting early this month are far from solved.

The Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been unable to agree on what steps should be taken in the area of confrontation in the city, but both sides appear willing to continue talks. A breakdown of negotiations could have serious consequences.

udice the upcoming UN General Assembly debate on Cyprus. Probably to avoid provoking Ankara, the Greek Cypriots this week allowed the unloading of the latest shipment of relief supplies for the Turkish Cypriots with less difficulty than usual.

Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriots may be planning to go ahead with the importation of Soviet-manufactured surface-to-air missiles which were purchased last winter but remain in Egypt.

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25X1 The apparent reluctance of each side to resume fighting may stem partly from a desire not to prej-

RHODESIA DECLARES INDEPENDENCE

Rhodesia remains generally calm following Prime Minister Smith's declaration of independence on 11 November, but plans are being made in London, Africa, and the United Nations for retaliatory measures against the rebel white regime.

The majority of white Rhodesians apparently support Smith's action, although there is evidence of bitterness among some senior civil servants, army officers, and businessmen, particularly those with close British ties. Smith's appeal to the government services for loyalty suggests that he fears a division among Rhodesian whites. He has appointed his deputy, Clifford Dupont, as the new governor to counter veteran Governor Gibb's claims to

be the Queen's legitimate representative in Rhodesia. The UK may still hope that Gibbs can be a focus for meaningful opposition, and although Smith has stripped Gibbs of his "trappings of office," London doubts that force will be used to remove him from his residence.

The US Consulate in Salisbury reports that there is no evidence of serious African unrest and that security forces can deal with any that develops. Africans failed in efforts to organize general strikes in Salisbury and Bulawayo, although there were some disorders in Bulawayo. African nationalist parties are badly divided, their leaders are interned or in exile, and they are probably incapable of

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more than sporadic violence, at least in the short run.

The predictably hostile reaction of African states to Smith's declaration has included calls for UK military intervention. No concrete measures have been organized by the African states themselves, however. East African leaders reportedly have decided to offer military reinforcements to Zambia rather than to press Britain for further action. A special meeting of the Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee confined itself largely to exhorting Rhodesian Africans to rise up against the Smith government. African demands for action are likely to become sharper if UK and UN economic measures fail to bring Smith's downfall.

The dilemma is particularly acute in neighboring Zambia, whose economy is enmeshed with Rhodesia's. So far Zambia's sanctions have been minimal. Leading cabinet members are pressing moderate President Kaunda to order a trade boycott, noting that about one fourth of Rhodesia's export earnings are derived from trade with Zambia. Kaunda is aware--and has been warned by London--that a boycott might provoke countermeasures from Salisbury that would cripple Zambia's all-important copper industry, but he may not be able to restrain the militants in his government for long.

Despite objections from elements of the Tory opposition, UK Prime Minister Wilson has won bipartisan approval in Parliament

for enabling legislation permitting the government to institute economic sanctions, including tobacco and sugar boycotts and exclusion of Rhodesia from the sterling area and the London money market. These measures would cause some economic dislocation in Rhodesia but its strong economy probably could not be severely crippled except by a long-term total trade embargo--a measure that would also damage the precarious UK balance of payments.

Differing views on the imposition of sanctions has produced a deadlock in the UN Security Council. African delegates soon retreated from demands for a resolution calling for the use of force, and now have prepared a resolution on an economic boycott. They have not yet formally submitted this one, however, in the face of strong opposition from Britain and the US.

South African Prime Minister Verwoerd has announced that his country will continue normal relations with Rhodesia and will not participate in any sanctions. This could be crucial to the Rhodesians who probably count on South African assistance to cushion the effects of sanctions from the rest of the world. Portugal, which provides Rhodesia access to the sea through Mozambique, is likely to discreetly continue normal relations with Rhodesia.

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Europe

CONTINUED DEADLOCK IN THE COMMON MARKET

The crisis in the European community remains on dead center with little prospect of any change before next year. France has not rejected the Five's offer to hold a session of the EEC Council without the EEC Commission, but is opposed to Brussels as its site. It is also trying to draw the Five into bilateral talks which can be portrayed by the Gaullists in the current election campaign as evidence that France is not intransigent, which will delay any showdown until after the elections are over, and which, Paris hopes, will erode the determination of the Five to keep any negotiations firmly in the community framework.

So far at least, the response of the Five has not given Paris much satisfaction, and they are going ahead with the council meeting scheduled for 29-30 November which will take up urgent community business.

How to proceed with the 10-percent reduction in tariffs that the members are scheduled to effect among themselves on 1 January now looms as a major agenda item. The reduction is automatic under the terms of the treaty unless the six--acting on a proposal of the commission--decide unanimously to delay it.

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By unhappy chance, the question has been complicated by the expiration at this time of an agreement which has permitted the EEC countries to keep some of their tariffs against non-members lower than the EEC treaty had envisaged. Paris may intend to insist on the nonrenewal of this agreement as its price for carrying out the internal tariff reduction.

There is in the meantime further evidence of the Five's increasing acceptance of a possible break with France as a contingency that must be planned for. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak told US Embassy officers last week that since an EEC of five could at best serve as a stop-gap for a matter of months, a "great opportunity" would be open to Britain if it would--which he doubted--avail itself of it. Some Dutch officials are reportedly toying with the idea that an interim community of Five should offer France an association arrangement which, the Dutch suggest, would allow Paris to define the extent of its isolation.

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NENNI SCORES VICTORY AT ITALIAN SOCIALIST CONGRESS

Socialist Vice Premier Nenni's success in dominating his party's recent national congress should strengthen the cohesion of Italy's four-party governing coalition.

The congress, which met from 10 to 14 November, approved all of Nenni's policies on basic issues including Socialist Party (PSI) continuation in the government and the reunification of the Socialist and Social Democratic (PSDI) parties, which split in 1947. A resolution opposing Nenni on both counts mustered only 20 percent of the congress vote, and its sponsors--followers of Riccardo Lombardi and the New Left faction--appear at least temporarily isolated within the party. Prior to the congress, Lombardi said that regardless of its outcome he would not leave the PSI.

The congress called for prompt parliamentary approval of the government's five-year economic plan (1966-70). It authorized the party's leadership to participate in drawing up a list of priorities with a view to implementing key parts of the coalition's program before the next general election in 1968. The delegates also approved the government's basic foreign policy positions, although they called for Peking's admission to the UN.

An anticipated showdown between Nenni and party secretary Francesco De Martino over the timing of a PSI-PSDI merger failed to materialize, and the congress authorized, for the first time, concrete steps to-

ward early reunification. The Italian Communist Party's appeal for the creation of a "unified workers' party of the left" was rejected, and the PSI proposed to the PSDI congress--scheduled to meet in January--the initiation of "a period of common action and the assumption of common responsibility at all levels."

No date was set for the formal merger of the parties, however, and further progress is likely to depend on the PSDI.

The congress approved a new party central committee of 101 members, to be composed of 80 representing the Nenni - De Martino majority faction, 19 representing the Lombardi - New Left minority faction, and two independents. According to the US Embassy in Rome, Nenni's followers within the majority faction have more than 51 members in the new central committee. Nenni will also assume the newly created post of president of the central committee, and he will be a member of the party directorate to be elected on 19 November.

Nenni's success at the congress may help to reduce tensions between the Socialists and Christian Democrats (CD), and perhaps ease the difficult task of moderate CDs in persuading their party that the Socialists are willing to act as responsible partners in the government. It should also give Nenni a freer hand to seek workable compromises with Premier Moro on thorny reform issues.

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Western Hemisphere

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Garcia Godoy appears to be moving ahead with plans to lend a more moderate cast to his provisional government. He has indicated that the ouster of leftist Attorney General Morel and his replacement by an undistinguished moderate are imminent. Garcia Godoy has moved to frustrate any efforts of the Communist dockworkers unions to prevent unloading of cargoes, and is resisting leftist demands to remove a politically neutral member of the elections board. The President is wooing local business leaders and devoting more time to economic problems.

Nevertheless, leftist infiltration of the provisional government has continued--including the appointment to a minor post in the agrarian reform program of a member of the central committee of the Dominican Communist Party. The President has not disbanded the judicial police, and members of the extremist-dominated constabulary are discussing plans to expand their presently limited authority.

Some conservative poli-

ticians seem to be employing the specter of a coup to pressure Garcia Godoy into action against the left and may be mollified by the more middle-of-the-road course he appears to be steering. 25X1

Defense Minister Rivera and air force chief De los Santos have in fact said they would not move against the government. The lack of such a commitment by army chief Martinez, who has frequently been linked to the plotters, may cost him his job. 25X1

The presence in downtown Santo Domingo of units of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF), and the refusal of Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party to sanction antigovernment and anti-IAPF demonstrations, have tamped down extremist agitation. 25X1

Moreover, Communist extremists are attempting to consolidate the considerable gains they made over the last few months. 25X1

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
NEGOTIATIONS LOOK TO FUTURE STATUS OF BRITISH HONDURAS

UK-Guatemalan negotiations over the future of the territory of British Honduras (Belize) began in Washington on 18 November under the auspices of an official American arbiter.

The century-old dispute is based on the Guatemalan claim (and British denial) that the 1859 treaty establishing the present boundaries of British Honduras has been rendered invalid by the alleged failure of the UK to fulfill certain of its obligations under the treaty. A subject of controversy for generations, the Belize issue caused the rupture of UK-Guatemalan diplomatic relations in 1963 when Great Britain, without consulting Guatemala, held a constitutional conference at which it was decided to grant self-government to British Honduras.

The outcome of the Belize problem will depend in large part on whether Guatemala will settle for a pragmatic political solution, or will press for satisfaction of its "juridical" claims to the entire territory. If the Guatemalans do insist on recognition of their "legal" rights, such tactics will complicate the dispute by inviting the Mexicans to push a rival claim to northern Belize.

BRITISH HONDURAS: TERRITORIAL CLAIMS



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GUATEMALAN POLITICAL SCENE

As the campaign for the March 1966 elections gets under way, strident partisan infighting indicates that the military regime's resolve to preside over a return to constitutional government via the electoral process will be sorely tested in the coming months.

In September, when it was apparent that the regime's plan to sponsor one candidate or to offer the voters a choice between two candidates acceptable to the Guatemalan military had aborted, Chief of Government Peralta warned that the army--though neutral--would intervene if the politicians could not show some promise of solving the country's problems.

Political tensions have been heightened by a nationwide coffee scandal touching many government appointees, by a worsening imbalance of payments, and by sporadic guerrilla raids on outlying army posts, rural estates, and arterial roads.

The mysterious death of favored presidential candidate Mario Mendez--an apparent but unexplained suicide--has provided the Revolutionary Party (PR) with a ready-made "martyr." The PR, under the leadership of

Mendez' brother, Julio Cesar Mendez, is seeking to pin the blame for his death on rightist conspirators, including the Peralta government. The prospect of vindicating its "martyr" at the polls lends impetus to the PR's efforts to forge a leftist coalition. Such a grouping almost certainly would spark a merger of rightist politicians and result in a bipolarization that would lead to increasing bitterness and encourage extremists on both sides.

Among the three legal, declared candidates for president--one leftist and two rightists--none appears likely to win enough of a plurality to ensure even short-term stability. However, with two conservative contenders, the PR candidate emerges as the man to beat at the moment.

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BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT SEEKS MORE CONTROL OVER MILITARY

President Castello Branco is taking steps to regain full control over the armed forces. General Terra Ururahy, commander of the First Army, has been re-assigned and other changes in key posts are planned. Officers of the First Army stationed in Rio de Janeiro have been among the most outspoken critics of the government during the unsettled period that has continued since the gubernatorial elections on 3 October.

The government is watching for renewed agitation in connection with his inauguration on 5 December.

The President's plan to reshuffle army commands, combined with the energetic political and economic measures he is instituting, has probably increased his authority among the armed forces. Castello Branco's prospects for restraining the more aggressive officers will remain favorable as long as he succeeds in maintaining the initiative.

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
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19 November 1965

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SPECIAL REPORT

YEMENI TRIBES SEEK END TO THREE YEARS' CIVIL WAR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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YEMENI TRIBES SEEK END TO THREE YEARS' CIVIL WAR

Yemeni republican and royalist leaders are scheduled to meet at the border town of Harad on 23 November to form a caretaker coalition government in the first full-scale effort to settle the three-year-old Yemeni civil war. The conference also provides the first major test of local support for the agreement last August between Egyptian President Nasir and Saudi King Faysal on steps to secure a settlement. When fighting broke out following the death of Imam Ahmad in September 1962, Egypt and Saudi Arabia became increasingly committed to republican and royalist sides in the civil war, with open warfare between the two principals often threatened. Present efforts toward peace represent Nasir's and Faysal's acceptance of the futility of continuing to seek a victory. The outcome of the conference depends primarily upon the interplay of traditional political pressures which have made and broken three other Yemeni revolts since World War II. At the moment most Yemeni leaders seem to want to end the years of bloodshed and to secure the evacuation of the Egyptians.

Yemeni Tribes

The Yemen revolution of 1962 which led to the Saudi-Egyptian confrontation initially differed little from the spasms that periodically have torn Yemen apart in the past. Yemen's complicated tribal and religious rivalries gave rise to the revolution, and seem likely to outlast any settlement.


Most of the organized tribes belong to the heterodox Zaydi sect of Islam and inhabit the northern and central mountains. They are highly independent, volatile, and warlike. Their allegiances and quarrels over the years have tended to dominate the lives of the Yemenis of the orthodox Shafai sect.

Although the Shafais as a people are about as numerous as the Zaydis, many have become merchants and artisans in the cities and have lost their tribal affiliation. Most of the nonurban Shafais are farmers. Some of them, such as the Zaraniq, are fearsome fighters, but the Shafai tribes of the coastal plain and the south have never been able to stand for long against the men of the north.

The Zaydis are Qahtani, a people believed to be the original inhabitants of southern Arabia, and consider other Arabs as being of impure blood. This ethnic pride separates them from the rest of the country as much as the wildness and remoteness of their mountain strongholds.

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JIDDA AGREEMENT OF 23 AUGUST 1965

The Jidda Agreement signed by Egypt's Nasir and Saudi Arabia's King Faysal provided for three major steps to end the fighting in Yemen:

1. By 23 Nov. 1965 - A cease-fire and cessation of Saudi arms aid to the Yemeni royalists. These steps have been taken.
2. By 23 Aug. 1966 - An all-Yemen conference of 25 delegates each from the royalist and republican sides to select a caretaker government that will rule during the evacuation of Egyptian troops from Yemen. This conference will open on 23 Nov. 1965.
3. By 23 Nov. 1966 - Preparation for nationwide plebiscite to select a permanent form of regime.

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They form clusters of tiny groups, proud and independent, and even individual tribes are often split into autonomous sections. They hold allegiance only to their local chief, and this only as long as he is strong enough to secure it. The tribal confederations are brought together only by war or money.

The Zaydi tribes also share a common acceptance of the religious guidance and temporal authority of an imam, a leader who is established by holy law and who possesses some degree of infallibility. His temporal powers wax and wane with the tides of tribal politics, however, and as this political power varied, so did stability in Yemen. In the past, he who held the Zaydi tribes held Yemen.

The Zaydi-Shafai schism arises mainly from nonreligious factors. Although the Zaydis are heterodox Shia Muslims, they are nevertheless closer to the orthodox Sunni Muslim faith of the Shafais than to any other Shia sect. Differences in their everyday mode of living are negligible and more than a few Shafais in the south are transplanted Zaydis from the north.

More important is the natural antipathy between hill man and city dweller, and between Qahtani and non-Qahtani Arabs--a source of feuds throughout the Arab world. Another major factor is the desire of the Shafais to carry on their trade and to govern themselves without being threatened from the north by Zaydi officials backed by a Zaydi imam and his warriors. As

recently as 1948, Imam Ahmad allowed the Zaydi tribes to sack Sana and other towns for several days as a reward for armed support.

The Imamate's Power

The Ottoman Turks, when they ruled Yemen, tried to end the ambiguity between the Imam's spiritual and temporal authority by means of a treaty, concluded in 1911, which specifically recognized him as the temporal ruler of the Zaydi tribes. When they left Yemen in 1918, the Ottomans also turned over to the Imam their authority in the Shafai areas, which they had ruled directly. These steps placed the power of governmental appointments and taxation in the hands of the Imam without the usual participation by tribal chiefs.

Although the imams readily seized upon this opportunity to strengthen their traditional Zaydi rule, exercise of their authority was far from unchallenged. Islamic law sanctions the ouster of any imam who is too weak to hold on to his job, and there have remained enough Zaydi families with a member who meets Islamic qualifications for the position to keep the contention open--the cause of many a bloody battle. The Shafais, recognizing no spiritual or legal rights of the Zaydi imams, have usually supported movements that promised them greater autonomy for internal tribal matters. Shafai backing of the 1962 revolution, as in previous revolts, originated in their hopes of gaining both autonomy and free trade.

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The Imams' Army

After World War I, the imams added to their new legal trappings the innovation of a professional army. This army was founded by Ottoman officers who stayed behind to work for the Imam, but it could not stand up against rebellious tribes because the rank and file remained loyal primarily to their own tribes. Thus, it was used primarily to collect taxes, although the Imam also felt the need for a security force which could handle the relatively modern weapons that became available after World War I and could man the borders against British-backed tribes in the Aden Protectorate.

The army has been dominated by Yemeni officers trained abroad and by foreign officers sent into the country. In 1934 the Imam sent the first batch of cadets, boys from politically innocuous families, to Baghdad for military training. The political results were disastrous. Despite their innocent background, these cadets produced a solid group of traitors to the Imam. Included were such revolutionaries as President Sallal, imprisoned for his role in the 1948 coup; Premier al-Amri; ex-Premier al-Jayfi; Ansi, executed for participating in the 1948 coup attempt; Thalaya, executed for the 1955 coup attempt; and Alfi, who committed suicide after the 1961 coup attempt.

This group, with all its revolutionary zeal, showed very little political preference. The officers have usually been against the incumbent ruler, rather than for any change in political phi-

losophy. They have become the "hard-line" group of Egyptian supporters, so unpopular among Yemenis that even the Egyptians are about ready to abandon them.

The Progressives and Nasir

Yemen also has some genuine progressives, men who have tasted the modernity of the outside world and who yearn to bring some of it home. These men include the two leaders of the "third force" which during the past year sought a middle ground between Egyptian- and Saudi-backed camps: Ahmad Numan, who was premier for three months early this year, and one-time deputy premier al-Zubayri, who was murdered last April. Other leading progressives include Muhsin Aini, sometime foreign minister, and Baydhani, the Cairo-born Yemeni who was the first republican deputy premier. Numan and Baydhani are Shafai; the others, Zaydi.

These men started working after World War II to build a more modern Yemen. Much of the time they exiled themselves in order to stay alive, but they kept in touch with Yemeni politics. In some instances, such as the 1948 coup attempt, Numan and al-Zubayri guided the course of events as leaders of the Free Yemeni Party based in Aden.


At first they worked for reform within the framework of the imamate, for here they could find the greatest support from the strongest elements opposed to the incumbent Imam. As successive coups failed, the progressives congregated in Cairo, itself in

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the midst of Nasir's reformist revolution. The intellectuals, such as Aini and Baydhani, were especially aware of the reformist trends in the Arab world generally.

Nasir, championing the revolutionary cause, was appeased for a while when Yemen joined Egypt and Syria in the United Arab States in 1958, but only three years later he broke with the Imam. Cairo's propaganda--previously beamed at Aden--now called for revolt in Yemen, and Baydhani broadcast a blueprint for a Yemeni republic based on Arab nationalism and social justice.



The Revolution of 1962

Sallal, who headed Imam Badr's Royal Guard, carried out his assignment to assassinate his chief with the same fumble-fingered efficiency that had characterized his failure in other coups. Badr escaped to the hills and began to raise the tribes, while Sallal proclaimed freedom throughout the realm. Exiled reformists scuttled home to claim their due, and the new government sought recognition and assistance from abroad.

Sallal acted like a Zaydi imam: beheading was wholesale and the prisons were filled. Sallal asked particularly for Egyptian aid, and by early October Egyptian troops and arms were flowing into Yemen.

Control soon passed to the Egyptians, who backed the sophisticated Baydhani for the top political role. When it soon became clear that Baydhani could not hold his own against home-grown intriguers, however, Sallal regained an ascendancy that he has held for three years--but with the unmistakable Egyptian warning that he was only a puppet whose strings led to Cairo.

Imam Badr in his mountain fastness also experienced some shifts in the imamate's traditional support. The great confederation of the Hashid and Bakil tribes, often called "the two wings of the imam," followed him only in part. Indeed, the paramount chief of the Hashid recalled how his father had been beheaded only two years earlier by Imam Ahmad in a fit of pique, and the chief encouraged the tribe to regain its rights under Sallal's republic. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, determined to stall Egyptian penetration of the Arabian peninsula, decided to arm and bankroll the Imam's royalists.

It now seems clear that, despite the Hashid defections and the expected Shafai support,

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Sallal's regime could not have survived for long without Egyptian troops and warplanes and tons of silver riyals. Even these tangible assets barely balanced the instinct of most tribes to follow a brave Imam in war, the fierce hill man's contempt for the effete city dwellers, the Shafai fear of the Zaydi tribes, and the general Yemeni aversion to foreign ways, even those of fellow Arabs from the Nile Delta.

The result was a stalemate. The Egyptians increased their political control until the republican government became virtually an extension of Nasir's office in Cairo. A maximum of perhaps 60,000 Egyptian troops were committed in Yemen. Egyptian planes were used savagely, and chemical weapons were employed. Soon, however, the pattern of fighting became relatively static: the Imam held the mountains; the Egyptians, with little republican help, held the cities and--by day--the roads.

When the Egyptians Leave

The Yemen revolution of 1962 was not a reformist revolt against reaction, as Egyptian and Yemeni propaganda would have it. Baydhani's social reforms probably stirred Sallal's patriotism far less than the thought of the Imam's hidden treasure. The Zaydi tribes who bore the brunt of the republican fighting were scarcely laying down their lives for the same foreign innovations against which they had revolted only two years earlier. They, like the royalists, fought for money with the hope that under a new and weaker

government they might regain traditional tribal rights stripped from them by the strong centralized governments of the last two Imams.

This situation is becoming more apparent as the Egyptians make it clear that they are preparing to leave. Tribal chiefs are preparing to renew old alignments, the Shafais are worried about the onslaught of Zaydi tribes, the military clique has attempted to wreck the armistice, and the progressives are seeking other patrons to bolster a republican government.

The true progressives in the republican movement, such as Numan, Aini, and many of the younger men, are a very small minority. The influence they have achieved is due largely to the alliances they have formed to oust the Egyptians. When the Egyptians leave, the progressives will have few allies.

Yemen needs two things to survive as even the humblest kind of state: money and a viable civil service. Egyptian withdrawal means that the government's main fiscal support is drying up. Egypt would doubtless like to find some means of keeping Yemen on a string, perhaps by offering financial aid in return for guerrilla bases to be used against Aden. But at present Egypt appears to be in financial straits itself.

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Money must be found, not only to operate the government and to pay off large debts, but to buy protection from the tribes until a substantial security force can be trained. Even the wildest imams could only control the tribes with money.

A civil service is equally important, for any future government will need one to replace the many Egyptian advisers who probably will be withdrawn. Even a new imamate will not be able to return to the one-man government of the previous imams. The present rudimentary civil service, which has never been given a real chance to develop in an Egyptian puppet regime, will certainly not be enough.

The most obvious source of future officials in any Yemeni government is the more than 700 Yemenis being trained in Soviet bloc countries. Moreover, because of its military and economic aid, the bloc will probably be in a strong diplomatic position in Yemen when the war ends. Imam Ahmad had made at least ten agreements with four bloc countries, beginning with the Soviet Union in 1955. The bloc was quick to recognize the republic in 1962 and continued to make aid agreements with the revolutionary regime. Some 500 Russian technicians and advisers in republican Yemen have built an excellent reputation for friendly helpful-

ness and for minding their own business.

The Harad Conference

Before the Yemenis can again try to run their own country, they must first agree among themselves on an all-Yemen caretaker government to oversee the evacuation of Egyptian troops, as provided in the Jidda agreement between Nasir and Faysal. Prospects for achieving this immediate goal probably are somewhat better than even.

The first Jidda requirement, obtaining an effective cease-fire, has been essentially met. Even though the battling Yemenis were not consulted by Nasir and Faysal on the terms of the agreement and many are disgruntled at being shoehorned into it, their desire for an end to the fighting has caused them to put aside for the moment the settling of personal or tribal scores. Only a few acts of banditry have disturbed the peace, and these seem to have strengthened the resolve of both royalists and republicans not to be drawn into thoughtless retaliation.

Most of the important Yemeni factions accept the Harad conference as providing their best hope for a Yemen independent of Egyptian control. The conference will comprise 50 delegates

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drawn equally from each side. They will in all likelihood be appointed by the respective patrons, Nasir and Faysal, with little reference to the Yemenis, but jockeying for a place on the delegations has dominated the preconference scene. Success in choosing a caretaker coalition government will require skills of the highest order, but in this instance the common desire to get rid of the Egyptians may carry the day. Nasir and Faysal have also made it unmistakably clear that they will do all they can to make the conference succeed.

Prospects

The atmosphere during the conference and during the ten-month period of troop withdrawal will tell much as to Yemen's prospects for an independent political future. As the Egyptians with-

draw, and especially if it seems they are leaving permanently, traditional tribal politics will return increasingly to the fore. Already tribal groups are seeking to renew age-honored alignments, unhampered by identification with royalists or republicans; compromises are being worked out on the basis of religious as much as political ties; and reformists and conservatives argue about much the same social and economic problems as before the revolution.

Against the bedrock of tribal power, neither the republicans nor the Imam in the critical interim period ahead will be able to exert sufficient influence to unite the country without the lavish use of gold, quite apart from the funds needed to run the government. They will of necessity look to foreign sources for such large amounts of money, and are unlikely to confine their search to Cairo and Riyadh.

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